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Abstract. In light of widespread concerns about the reliability of self-reported disability, we
investigate what can be learned about the prevalence of work disability under various assumptions
on the reporting error process. Developing a nonparametric bounding framework, we ￿nd that
inferences are highly sensitive to the maintained assumptions ￿especially to how one models po-
tential inconsistencies between subjective self-assessments of work limitation and more objective
measures of functional limitation. We estimate tight bounds under our strongest assumptions but
then ￿nd that identi￿cation deteriorates rapidly as the assumptions are relaxed.
JEL classi￿cation: C14, I1
￿Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Virginia, 2015 Ivy Road, Rm 417, Char-
lottesville, VA 22904, 434-924-3402 (ph), 434-982-2904 (fax)1. INTRODUCTION
Health status has long been recognized as a crucial determinant of many important economic
decisions, including choices about whether to participate in the labor force or enroll in public
transfer programs. Yet there exists widespread concern about the reliability of self-reported health
and disability in survey datasets. A person￿ s self-assessed degree of work capacity, in particular,
may be in￿ uenced by a variety of economic, psychological, and social factors. Work disability, after
all, is not a purely medical phenomenon; two individuals with identical medical pathologies may
have di⁄erent abilities to work in the labor market. The potential for large classi￿cation errors
has been widely accepted as a central problem for social science research and for administrative
purposes in de￿ning eligibility for government assistance programs (e.g., U.S. General Accounting
O¢ ce, 1997; Institute of Medicine, 2002). Ongoing debates about measuring the presence of work-
limiting disabilities, the e⁄ects of health on labor market decisions, and the in￿ uence of Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on declining labor force participation rates have all
emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability information (e.g., Haveman
and Wolfe (1984) vs. Parsons (1984); Bound (1991a) vs. Parsons (1991)).1
This paper focuses on the problem of drawing inferences on the prevalence of long-term work
disability using self-reports of work capacity. Numerous studies measure disability status based
on subjective self-reports of limitation, such as responses to questions of the form: ￿Do you have
a health impairment that limits the kind or amount of work you can perform?￿We examine the
prevalence of ￿true disability￿among respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
survey of persons nearing retirement commonly used to evaluate the e⁄ects of disability on the work
behavior of older persons. In the HRS, nearly 21% of the respondents report having a long-term
work limitation caused by a medical problem; about half of these respondents report being unable
to work altogether.
Many researchers are skeptical of the accuracy of these self-reports. Bound and Burkhauser
1Bound (1991b) provides a comprehensive analysis of the econometric issues surrounding the debates.
1(1999, p. 3446), for example, suggest the possibility that ￿those who apply for SSDI and especially
those who are awarded bene￿ts tend to exaggerate the extent of their work limitations (relative to
those who do not apply)...￿Eligibility for disability transfers is speci￿cally tied to diminished work
capacity. Others (e.g., Bowe, 1993) have argued that the threshold for claiming disability may be
lower for those who ￿nd themselves out of the labor force, either by choice or through involuntarily
unemployment. Some who have withdrawn from the labor force prior to normal retirement age
may rationalize their employment status as driven mostly by their health conditions instead of
by other factors, such as high preferences for leisure or unlucky labor market outcomes. The
psychology literature discusses the potential medical role of ￿negative a⁄ectivity￿in respondents￿
self-assessments of disability status (e.g., Watson and Clark, 1984).
Studies that have modeled and assessed the reliability of self-reported work limitations have not
resolved these issues. Using a variety of parametric latent variable models to assess the impact of
health on labor market outcomes, several researchers have found evidence of systematic disability
reporting errors. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), O￿ Donnell (1999), Kreider (1999, 2000), and
Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2004), for example, estimate large reporting errors that are related to
labor force status. In contrast, Stern (1989) and Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) accept the hypothesis
that labor market outcomes do not a⁄ect reporting behavior. These con￿ icting ￿ndings are di¢ cult
to reconcile. Most related studies impose what seem to be sensible restrictions on the reporting
process. However, to address structural questions involving the simultaneous interactions between
health status, government assistance programs, and labor market behaviors, these studies also
impose strong parametric assumptions.
To disentangle these issues, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004) isolate the problem of inferring disability
status. Using an innovative approach that focuses on a subsample of applicants for federal disability
bene￿ts, they compare self-reports of work incapacity to the Social Security Administrations￿ s (SSA)
award decision. Under the identifying assumption that the SSA￿ s de￿nition of disability forms the
social standard for what constitutes work incapacity (see Sections 2 and 4.3), they ￿nd that the
2disability self-reports are largely accurate. As they acknowledge, however, questions about the
reliability of self-reported disability remain. Well-documented concerns about the reliability of SSA
award decisions (U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce, 1997; Institute of Medicine, 2002) coupled with
the possibility that self-reports may be in￿ uenced by the award outcome itself (possible for about a
third of their sample for which self-reported disability status was recorded after the award decision)
could lead both measures to be biased. More generally, even if self-reported work incapacity is
unbiased within the pool of disability applicants, this result may not extend to nonapplicants or to
less stringent notions of work disability of interest in other settings (see Section 2).
Given the ongoing debates about measuring work limitations, we similarly focus on the nar-
row but complex problem of inferring disability rates from self-reported survey data. In contrast
to Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004), we assess disability among the general population of individuals
nearing retirement age and thus do not observe an alternative direct measure of work limitation.
Instead, we develop and apply a nonparametric bounding methodology that allows us to assess the
identifying power of some basic assumptions about the reporting process that have been applied
in the literature. By narrowly focusing on the problem of inferring disability, we abstract away
from the parametric assumptions used in the structural models, focusing instead on the identifying
power of the more primitive assumptions about the reporting process.
We describe the data and di⁄erent measures of limitation in Section 2. In Section 3, we de-
velop a methodological framework to infer disability in corrupt data in which we assume, initially,
that nothing is known about the patterns of reporting errors. We do not focus on providing point
estimates of the true disability rates. Instead, in extending the nonparametric bounding methods
developed by Horowitz and Manski (1995), we provide a unifying framework that allows us to
explore what can be learned under di⁄erent restrictions on the reporting process. This framework
allows one to assess the sensitivity of inferences about work disability to the strength of the iden-
tifying assumptions. Two classes of assumptions are considered: ￿rst, we consider ￿veri￿cation￿
assumptions that formalize the notion of placing more con￿dence in some responses than others
3(e.g., depending on corresponding medical evidence); and second, we consider monotone instrumen-
tal variable (MIV) assumptions that specify monotonic relationships between the true disability
rate and certain observed covariates, such as labor force participation and age.
In developing these models, we extend the econometric literature by providing sharp bounds
on the mean of a binary random variable when nothing is known about the accuracy of the classi-
￿cations for an unveri￿ed portion of the sample while random errors may occur in the remaining
portion. Our Proposition 1 bounds provide an explicit treatment of binary outcomes in the corrupt
sampling setting.2 Moreover, by allowing for random classi￿cation errors within veri￿ed subgroups,
we depart from both the nonparametric (e.g., Manski, 1995; Dominitz and Sherman, 2004) and
parametric (e.g., Kreider, 1999; McGarry, 2004) literatures that assume fully accurate reporting
within certain subgroups. We also formally correct for the ￿nite sample bias of the plug-in MIV es-
timator that arises from taking sups and infs over collections of estimates. Without this correction,
the estimated MIV bounds would be too narrow.
In Sections 4 and 5, we present results and draw conclusions. We ￿rst study what can be learned
about the prevalence of work disability in the general population. We then turn to inferences for
the subsample of disability insurance applicants, the group studied by Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004).
Since we observe no objective measure of true work capacity, there invariably will be questions
about the credibility of any veri￿cation or MIV assumption. Thus, a primary objective is to assess
how inferences vary under di⁄erent seemingly reasonable restrictions. To do so, we exploit the
wealth of information available in the HRS on health and labor market status to motivate and
assess the identifying power of di⁄erent assumptions. For example, we might have more con￿dence
that a respondent truly has a signi￿cant work limitation if the respondent also reports a serious,
objectively diagnosed health condition that is known to be associated with disability (e.g., having
had a stroke).
2Bollinger (1996) has previously bounded the mean regression in the classical errors-in-variables setting when the
mismeasured regressor is binary. Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming) relax the independence assumption, allowing the
binary regressor to come from a corrupt sampling process. To illustrate their methodology, they analyze what can
be learned about employment outcomes among the disabled when disability status is unobserved.
4Our results help reveal the nature and extent to which our knowledge about the prevalence of
disability is limited by our lack of understanding of reporting errors. Inferences are quite sensitive
to the speci￿c veri￿cation model. Under our strongest assumptions, we precisely identify the
prevalence of disability and ￿nd some evidence of systematic misreporting. Under more conservative
models, however, we can only bound the prevalence rate to lie within a wide (e.g., over 20 point)
range which includes the accurate reporting rate.
2. DATA
Our analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study, a nationally representative
survey of 7608 households whose heads were nearing retirement age (aged 51-61) at the time of the
initial interview in 1992-93.3 The HRS has become an especially popular data source for studying
the e⁄ects of health status and public policy on work behavior of older persons because of its
detailed information about health and disability, work history, and participation in public transfer
programs. The ￿rst wave is comprised of 12,652 respondents (heads and other adult household
members). As common in micro analyses of the HRS data, we restrict our sample to the 9,824
age-eligible respondents born between 1931 and 1941.
Our analysis focuses on inferring long-term disability rates in the ￿rst wave of the survey using
responses to direct questions on work limitation. HRS respondents were asked, ￿Do you have any
impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?￿Those who
answered in the a¢ rmative to this broad disability question were asked the more narrow question:
￿Does this limitation keep you from working altogether?￿Of the 9824 respondents, 2039 (20:8%
of the sample) reported a long-term work limitation and 992 (10:1% of the sample) reported being
3We have examined the robustness of our main results using data from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative sample of 36,800 households. For the SIPP, we use
information from all 60,265 individuals between the ages of 18 and 69, the age range surveyed about the existence of
work limitations. We further check robustness using data from the U.S. Census. Our primary results are consistent
across these data sources, though we cannot replicate many of our models due to a lack of comparable data. These
auxiliary results are available from the authors. See Maag and Wittenburg (2003) for discussion about disability
measurement issues for the SIPP.
5unable to work altogether.4 We also use information from the second wave, conducted two years
after the ￿rst wave, to help resolve uncertainty about pending applications for federal disability
bene￿ts.
Responses to these work limitation questions provide convenient summary measures of disability
(especially for computationally expensive dynamic programming models) and are often viewed to
be more informative about work capacity than more objective yet indirect proxies, such as the
presence of speci￿c health conditions or functional limitations (e.g., Haveman and Wolfe, 1984).5
In particular, these direct disability questions capture the notion of both physical and mental
limitations as well as the more elusive ideas involving social context. These ideas are re￿ ected
in Nagi￿ s (1965) seminal work and espoused by both the World Health Organization (WHO) and
framers of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Nagi (1965) relates disability to ￿the
expression of a physical or a mental limitation￿in a social context such as the workplace. The
WHO framework is similar: ￿In the context of a health experience, a disability is any restriction or
lack of ability (resulting from an impairment) to perform an activity in the manner or within the
range considered normal for a human being￿(World Health Organization, 1980). Under the ADA,
disability requires the presence of ￿a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities,￿such as performing tasks on the job (Americans with Disabilities Act,
1990). Each of these conceptualizations of disability allows for the possibility that substantial work
capacity remains.6
Since employment and disability are not mutually exclusive, researchers interested in studying
the impact of disability on labor market behaviors have relied largely on the broader measure of
￿some limitation￿in work capacity. In some contexts, however, the more restrictive ￿inability to
4Focusing on long-term disability, we code a respondent reporting a work limitation as not disabled if the underlying
health problem is reported to be only temporary and expected to last for less than three months (77 such cases).
There were 22 missing values for these questions that we code as not disabled for purposes of presenting descriptive
statistics. When estimating bounds on disability rates, however, we take worst cases and allow for the possibility
that some or all of these respondents may be truly disabled.
5Using the HRS data, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (1999) ￿nd that self-reported disability status constitutes a powerful
predictor of disability insurance applications and awards.
6See the Institute of Medicine (2002, Chapter 2) for further discussion of the conceptual issues in de￿ning disability.
6work￿de￿nition may be of more interest. For example, the Social Security Administration (U.S.
Social Security Administration, 2006) requires recipients of federal disability insurance bene￿ts to
demonstrate ￿the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.￿In 2006, substantial
gainful activity is de￿ned as earnings exceeding $860 per month ($500 per month during the time
of the HRS survey). We estimate bounds on the disability rates for both the broad and restrictive
measure of disability.
As elaborated in Section 4, our estimated bounds on the true disability rates combine these self-
reports of work limitation with other information in the HRS that can potentially shed light on the
reliability of these self-reports. Table I displays means and standard deviations for selected variables
used in our analysis. As expected, labor market and disability insurance status vary substantially
with reported disability status. For example, the employment rate is 2:6 times higher among those
reporting no work limitation compared with those reporting some limitation (78% compared with
30%). Likewise, just over half the respondents reporting work limitations and nearly four-￿fths
reporting being unable to work altogether had applied for federal disability bene￿ts from SSDI or
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), whereas very few respondents reporting no work limitation
had applied for bene￿ts. Because the HRS does not distinguish between SSDI and SSI applications,
from this point on we refer to SSDI/SSI jointly as the SSA￿ s Disability Insurance (DI) program.7
Although work disability is not synonymous with general health status, there is undoubtedly a
close relationship given the potential impact of health conditions on work capacity. Our analysis
exploits a wealth of information on a respondent￿ s reported physical and mental health to aid in
7The federal government provides cash and medical bene￿ts to the disabled through the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The formal limitation eligibility criteria for
the two programs are identical, requiring a medically determinable impairment that prevents the applicant from
engaging in any ￿substantial gainful activity.￿SSI bene￿ts are means-tested and do not require prior work history,
whereas SSDI bene￿ts are set according to a recipient￿ s prior earnings. Based on personal correspondence with an
SSA o¢ cial, it appears that SSDI applications are routinely screened for potential SSI eligibility and vice versa. In
this light, applicants are e⁄ectively applying for bene￿ts from both programs.
7implementation of the veri￿cation and MIV assumptions. For example, a respondent reporting
to be disabled but in excellent physical and mental health might not be veri￿ed as providing an
accurate disability report.
In Table I, we display the means of these health-related variables by reported disability status.
Table II displays a matrix of correlation coe¢ cients for the numerous health and limitation measures
used in this analysis. We observe three general categories of health-related information: subjec-
tive measures of general health, alternative measures of physical limitation, and speci￿c health
conditions.
At the most basic level, we exploit information from two generic questions about a respondent￿ s
physical and mental health status. About 42% of respondents reporting a work limitation claim to
be in fair or poor general physical health, compared with only 12% among those reporting no work
limitation. The correlation coe¢ cient between these two measures is 0:52. Patterns are similar for
reported emotional health status, although the correlation coe¢ cient is only 0:31.
Another series of health-related questions provides information on other measures of limitation.
To avoid using subjective self-reports of disability, some researches have relied on indirect summary
measures like body mass (e.g., Gruber and Kubik, 1997) or subsequent mortality (e.g., Parsons,
1980).8 In our sample, 3% of respondents died before the second interview could take place (Table
I) and nearly 60% have a body mass outside the ideal range de￿ned by Fahey et al. (1997).9 These
measures of limitation are clearly associated with self-reports of disability. The mortality rate, for
example, is more than four times higher among those reporting a work limitation (7:5% compared
with 1:8%) and more than ￿ve times higher among those reporting an inability to work at all (11%
compared with 2:1%). While not particularly large, di⁄erences in the ideal body mass indicator
8Others, however, have criticized indirect measures as being poor indicators of disability status. Haveman and
Wolfe (1984), for example, view mortality experience as a ￿weak and arbitrary￿proxy for disability status. Many
conditions a⁄ecting disability status (e.g., back problems) do not normally contribute to an early death, and many
deaths occur for reasons unrelated to the source of a work limitation.
9They de￿ne ideal body mass to be 20-25 kilograms per meter. We calculate body mass for each respondent using
information in the HRS on height and weight.
8across reported disability status are also statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, these
alternative measures appear to provide di⁄erent information about limitations ￿the means vary
from 0:03 for subsequent mortality to 0:209 for self-reported disability to 0:589 for non-ideal body
mass, and the correlations range from only 0:02 to 0:13.
Beyond these indirect proxy measures of limitation, the HRS includes a battery of direct ques-
tions related to a respondent￿ s ability to perform basic functions. Activities of daily living indicators
(ADLs) are intended to measure the ability to undertake basic self-care functions such as eating
or dressing without help. Instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) are intended to measure
capabilities relevant to independent living, such as the ability to travel beyond walking distance.
Such limitations do not directly measure work disability, but they may often contribute to di¢ -
culties in performing job-related tasks. For each of these functional activities, a respondent can
answer ￿not at all di¢ cult,￿￿a little di¢ cult,￿￿somewhat di¢ cult,￿￿very di¢ cult/can￿ t do,￿or
￿don￿ t do.￿ 10 Respondents were told to disregard any limitation expected to last less than three
months.
Using de￿nitions suggested by Loporest et al. (1995, p. S297), we aggregate this information
into an index of functional limitations. The ￿rst step is to create four categories of functions:
(I) Basic functions include the ability to (a) get in and out of bed without help, (b) bathe or
shower without help, (c) eat without help, (d) dress without help, and (e) walk across a room; (II)
Sedentary work functions include the ability to (a) sit for about two hours and (b) get up from a
chair after sitting for a long period; (III) Physical work functions include the ability to (a) walk
several blocks, (b) stoop/ kneel/crouch, (c) pick up a dime from a table, and (d) reach or extend
arms above shoulder level; (IV) Very physical work functions include the ability to (a) climb several
￿ ights of stairs without resting, (b) lift or carry weights over 10 pounds, and (c) pull or push large
objects like a living room chair. Given these four categories, the functional limitation index is then
10As pointed out by Loporest et al. (1995), the language ￿don￿ t do￿is somewhat problematic for interpretation
since this response may not re￿ ect an inability to perform the task. Nevertheless, we follow their approach and group
the ￿can￿ t do￿and ￿don￿ t do￿responses together.
9constructed based on the following outcomes:11
￿ Level 0: No functional limitation
￿ Level 1: Some di¢ culty with very physical work functions
￿ Level 2: Very di¢ cult/can￿ t do one of the very physical work functions
￿ Level 3: Some di¢ culty with physical or sedentary work functions
￿ Level 4: Very di¢ cult/can￿ t do one of the physical work or sedentary work functions
￿ Level 5: Some di¢ culty with any basic function
￿ Level 6: Very di¢ cult/can￿ t do one of the basic functions
As expected, respondents reporting work limitations are more inclined to report functional
limitations. Still, these measures seem to re￿ ect di⁄erent aspects of reported impairment. For
example, nearly 14% of those reporting a work limitation and 5% of those reporting the inability
to work altogether do not report di¢ culty with any of the activities. In Section 4, we examine how
inferences on work disability depend on assumptions about the relationship between work disability
and functional limitations.
Finally, we exploit self-reported information on the presence of speci￿c clinical health conditions
recorded in the HRS. Wallace and Herzog (1995) focus on a subset of reported conditions in the
HRS that are expected to be the most prevalent among middle-aged and elderly persons and/or
most likely to result in work disability. In most cases, responses to questions about the presence of
a condition can be combined with responses to follow-up questions that help indicate the severity
of the condition. Following Wallace and Herzog￿ s de￿nitions, Table I provides prevalence rates
for six speci￿c serious and objective conditions: diabetes (plus currently taking insulin), cancer
(with treatment in the last 12 months), chronic lung disease (with reported activity limitations), a
heart condition (congestive heart disease with prescribed medication or accompanied by shortness
of breath), stroke (with reported health consequences), and psychiatric problems (currently taking
medication or receiving treatment). We also report on the prevalence of arthritis and hypertension,
11Loporest et al. (1995) recognize some ambiguity in the index. For example, the severity of physical versus seden-
tary functions is unclear, as are comparisons between being unable to perform a physical activity versus having some
di¢ culty with a very physical function. Nevertheless, we ￿nd their aggregation approach to represent a signi￿cant
advancement over the usual approach of simply counting the number of reported ADLs and IADLs.
10along with nine medical conditions associated with a major organ system: asthma, back problems,
problems with legs or feet, kidney or bladder problems, stomach or intestinal ulcers, high cholesterol,
the occurrence of a fracture since age 45, poor eyesight (with glasses), and poor hearing (with
hearing aid).
While self-reports on health conditions are almost certainly more objective than self-reports on
work disability, they do not speci￿cally measure disability.12 Across all of the 17 conditions listed
in Table I, respondents who report a work limitation report an average of 4.02 conditions compared
with 1.58 conditions among those reporting no work limitation.
3. CLASSIFICATION ERROR MODEL
While the disability questions are notably ambiguous, survey designers clearly have an expec-
tation that respondents will be able to place these questions about work limitation in a reasonable
social context. When a survey asks whether a respondent is ￿unable to work altogether,￿for exam-
ple, it is understood that the respondent might reasonably answer ￿yes￿even though hypothetically
it might be possible to perform some small amount of work. The threshold for answering in the
a¢ rmative depends on current social norms for what constitutes an inability to work (see, e.g.,
Kapteyn et al., forthcoming).
The problem is that some respondents might use a di⁄erent threshold for assessing disability.
While it seems unlikely that a signi￿cant number of survey respondents are prone to willfully misrep-
resent their work capacity, especially in con￿dential surveys, a much greater concern in the literature
revolves around the possibility that social or psychological factors can lead to self-rationalization.
Concerns over systematic misreporting are generally based on two distinct observations, one ￿nan-
cial and one social. First, eligibility for government disability assistance programs is tied to both
earnings and disability status (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). Second, some people may feel social
pressure to be working until normal retirement age (Bound, 1991b; Bowe, 1993). Thus, short of in-
12Also, despite the relative objectivity of speci￿c conditions, the potential for misreporting remains. For example,
conditions may be misdiagnosed, and respondents may be reluctant to disclose the presence of a condition. Conditions
might often go undiagnosed for some time, especially among respondents with limited access to health care providers.
11tentionally misreporting, some nonworkers or disability insurance applicants might have a di⁄erent
threshold for equating a health condition with a work limitation. To help rationalize a nonemploy-
ment spell, for example, nonworkers might be more prone than workers to interpret a particular
medical problem (e.g., a bad back of a given severity) as a work limitation. At the same time, other
respondents might not wish to admit that they are having di¢ culty coping with a health condition,
so they might claim to be able-bodied despite having a substantial work limitation.
To evaluate the impact of invalid response, we introduce notation that distinguishes between
self-reports and the truth. Let X be the self-reported measure, where X = 1 if the respondent
reports a limitation and 0 otherwise. Let W = 1 indicate that the individual is truly disabled
relative to the intent of the survey question, with W = 0 otherwise. Finally, let Z indicate whether
a respondent provides accurate information, with Z = 1 if W = X and Z = 0 otherwise. We are
interested in making inferences on the unobserved true disability rate, P(W = 1).
Some fraction, P(X = 1;Z = 0), inaccurately report being disabled (false positives) while
others, P(X = 0;Z = 0), inaccurately report being nondisabled (false negatives). Thus, the true
and reported disability rates are related as follows:
P(W = 1) = P(X = 1) + P(X = 0;Z = 0) ￿ P(X = 1;Z = 0). (1)
The observed disability rate equals the true disability rate if the fraction of false negative reports
exactly o⁄sets the fraction of false positive reports. The data, however, only identify the fraction
of the population that self-reports disability, P(X = 1). The sampling process cannot identify the
fraction of false negative or false positive reports.
As a starting point, it is useful to evaluate what can be inferred about the disability rate
P(W = 1) given prior information on the fraction of respondents who provide valid self-reports. In
particular, suppose
P(Z = 1) ￿ v (2)
where v is a known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. By varying the value of v, we can
consider the wide range of views characterizing the debate on inaccurate reporting. Those willing
12to assume fully accurate reporting can set v = 1, in which case the sampling process identi￿es
the disability rate. Those uncomfortable with placing any lower bound on the fraction of accurate
responses (e.g., Myers, 1982; Bowe, 1993) can set v = 0, in which case the sampling process is
uninformative. Middle ground positions are evaluated by setting v somewhere between 0 and 1.
Given the restriction that no more than some fraction, 1 ￿ v, of the population misreports
disability status, we know from (1) that
maxfP(X = 1) ￿ (1 ￿ v);0g ￿ P(W = 1) ￿ minfP(X = 1) + (1 ￿ v);1g. (3)
These bounds are derived by Horowitz and Manski (1995, Proposition, Corollary 1.2). Henceforth,
we will refer to these bounds as the HM bounds. Intuitively, the bounds narrow as the upper bound
misreporting rate, 1 ￿ v, declines.
In the HRS sample, 20:8% of respondents report some work limitation. The bounds in (3)
reveal that this self-reported disability measure provides only modest information about the true
disability rate unless v is large. In fact, the HM bounds remain completely uninformative unless it
can be assumed that the accurate reporting rate exceeds 20:8%; the lower bound is zero unless it
is known that at least 79:2% of responses are accurate.
To narrow these identi￿cation bounds, we consider two di⁄erent classes of assumptions linking
observed covariates to the reporting process and the true disability rate. In Section 3.1, we consider
veri￿cation assumptions that place more con￿dence in some responses than others. In Section 3.2,
we consider the identifying power of monotonicity assumptions linking disability and observed
covariates such as age, employment, and the presence of physician-diagnosed health conditions. In
Section 3.3, we describe the estimator and, in particular, focus on a bias correction for the plug-in
estimator of the nonparametric instrumental variable bound.
3.1. PARTIAL VERIFICATION OF OBSERVED SUBGROUPS
Short of assuming fully accurate reporting, a number of researchers combine distributional
restrictions with assumptions of fully accurate disability self-reports within particular groups of
13respondents. Kreider (1999) and McGarry (2004), for example, explicitly assume that workers
provide fully accurate responses, remaining agnostic about the self-reports from nonworkers. In
the spirit of these ideas, we evaluate what can be inferred about the true disability rate when prior
information is brought to bear on the degree of misreporting within certain observed subgroups.
For now, we focus on basic notation. Our speci￿c veri￿cation strategies are presented in Section 4.
To formalize the notion of partial veri￿cation, let Y = 1 indicate that a respondent belongs to
a veri￿ed subgroup, with Y = 0 otherwise. Using the law of total probability, we can decompose
the true disability rate by subgroups:
P(W = 1) = P(W = 1jY = 1)P(Y = 1) + P(W = 1jY = 0)P(Y = 0). (4)
Although respondents in the veri￿ed subgroups might have few incentives to misreport, there
may remain random errors: respondents may make mistakes in assessing the disability threshold,
valid reports can be miscoded, and so forth. So, in contrast to the existing literature, we allow
for the possibility of exogenous response errors within the veri￿ed group such that there can be
partial veri￿cation. Formally, let vy be the known lower bound fraction of accurate reporters
in the veri￿ed subgroup and assume that at least half of the veri￿ed group reports accurately:
P(Z = 1jY = 1) ￿ vy ￿ 1
2.13 Let the reporting errors in the veri￿ed group be random so that
P(W = 1jY = 1) = P(W = 1jY = 1;Z).14 No prior information is assumed about the validity
of self-reports from the unveri￿ed cases. Then the following bounds follow (see Appendix A for a
proof):15
13The assumption that at least half the reports are accurate is applied by Bollinger (1996) and others and seems
consistent with the notion of veri￿cation. In fact, however, the bounds derived in Proposition 1 extend to all
vy ￿ minfP(X = 1jY = 1);P(X = 0jY = 1)g. Otherwise, the Proposition 1 bounds that follow do not apply.
14We relax this independence assumption, termed contaminated sampling by Horowitz and Manski (1995), as part
of the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.
15Molinari (2005) independently derives a similar result using a di⁄erent approach that does not focus on partial
veri￿cation. For a wide class of models, she shows that the relationship between the distribution of a true variable and
its potentially mismeasured counterpart can be represented by a linear system of simultaneous equations involving
a coe¢ cient matrix of misclassi￿cation probabilities. She then shows how restrictions on this matrix (depending on
the underlying assumptions of the model) can be used to partially identify regions for the true variable.
14Proposition 1: Let ￿i = 1[vy > P(X = ijY = 1)], i = 0;1 and ￿ = 1[P(X = 0jY = 1) > P(X =
1jY = 1). Then if P(Z = 1jY = 1) ￿ vy ￿ 1
2 for a known vy and P(W = 1jZ;Y = 1) = P(W =





vy ￿ P(X = 0jY = 1)
2vy ￿ 1
+ (1 ￿ ￿)P(X = 1jY = 1)
￿
P(Y = 1)





￿P(X = 1jY = 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)
vy ￿ P(X = 0jY = 1)
2vy ￿ 1
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿
1)
￿
P(Y = 1) + P(Y = 0).
By varying the value of vy, we can assess the sensitivity of the bounds to the strength of the
veri￿cation assumption. In the special case that all respondents in veri￿ed groups are known to
provide accurate reports (vy = 1)16 then
P(X = 1;Y = 1) ￿ P(W = 1) ￿ P(X = 1;Y = 1) + P(Y = 0). (5)
In this informational setting, the true disability rate is intuitively no less than the reported rate
among veri￿ed cases and no greater than this rate plus the fraction of unveri￿ed cases. Thus, the
width of this bound is the fraction of unveri￿ed cases, P(Y = 0). Intuitively, for example, in the
special case where all workers are known to provide accurate reports about limitation, then the
true disability rate must be at least as high as the fraction of workers claiming limitation but no
larger than this fraction plus the fraction of nonworkers.
3.2. MONOTONICITY ASSUMPTIONS
The Propositions 1 bounds can be further narrowed when combined with monotonicity assump-
tions linking disability and observed covariates. Consider, for example, age and disability. The
incidence of many debilitating health conditions rises with age, and many health conditions are
persistent once developed. The resulting tendency for individuals to accumulate health problems
over time suggests that the population disability rate is nondecreasing in age.
16This model is precisely the case of censored outcomes considered by Manski (1995). The assumption of fully
accurate reporting within certain groups was also evaluated by Lambert and Tierney (1997) and Dominitz and
Sherman (2004) for the case of contaminated sampling.
15To formalize the age monotonicity assumption, let u measure the age of the respondent and
let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available
information on the true disability rate, P(W = 1ju): Age is a monotone instrumental variable
(MIV) if the true disability rate weakly increases with u. Under this restriction, Manski and
Pepper (2000, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1) show that
sup
u0￿u1
LB(u1) ￿ P(W = 1ju = u0) ￿ inf
u0￿u2
UB(u2): (6)
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption.
The MIV bound on the unconditional disability rate, P(W = 1), is easily obtained using the
law of total probability. If the disability rate weakly increases in u, then
X
u0￿U
P(u = u0)f sup
u0￿u1
LB(u1)g ￿ P(W = 1) ￿
X
u0￿U
P(u = u0)f inf
u0￿u2
UB(u2)g:
Thus, to ￿nd the MIV bounds on the disability rate, one takes the weighted average of the upper
and lower bounds across the di⁄erent values of the instrument.
Since the MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, we combine this assumption with
the previous veri￿cation assumptions. In this case, the MIV can have identifying power if the
veri￿cation probability or the observed disability rate is not monotonic in age.
3.3. ESTIMATION
The Proposition 1 bounds are functions of various nonparametrically estimable probabilities
and thus can be consistently estimated by ￿plugging-in￿the sample analogs. Estimation of the
MIV bounds, however, is complicated by the fact that the monotonicity restrictions in Equation
(6) must be imposed over collections of various estimates. In ￿nite samples, estimators that take
sups and infs are systematically biased such that the estimated bounds will be too narrow.
To measure and correct for this bias, we present a modi￿ed estimator that uses a nonparametric
bootstrap bias correction. The basic idea is straightforward. Let Tn be a consistent analog estimator
of some unknown parameter ￿ such that the bias of this estimator is bn = E(Tn) ￿ ￿. Using
16the bootstrap distribution of Tn, one can estimate this bias as b b = E￿(Tn) ￿ Tn where E￿(￿) is
the expectation operator with respect to the bootstrap distribution. A bootstrap bias-corrected
estimator then follows as Tc
n = Tn ￿b b = 2Tn￿ E￿(Tn).17
For this application, let the parameter of interest, ￿, be the MIV lower bound on P(W = 1)
(the upper bound case is analogous), let LBn(j) be the plug-in estimate of the MIV lower bound
on P(W = 1ju = j) for each age group j = 1;:::;J, and let Tn be the uncorrected MIV lower
bound estimate across all age groups. To estimate these bounds, we divide the sample into 39 age
groups containing 252 respondents per group (251 in four of the groups). Then for each cell, the
veri￿cation bounds are estimated and the MIV restrictions in Equation (6) are applied. Finally,
we compute the MIV lower bound, Tn =
P
j￿U Pn(j)fsupj￿j0 LBn(j0)g, where Pn(j) is the fraction
of respondents in age group j.
The bias bn is estimated using the bootstrap sampling distribution of Tn. In particular, we ran-
domly draw with replacement from the empirical distribution 10;000 independent pseudo-samples
of the original data. Then, using these samples, we compute a set of 10;000 lower bound MIV
estimates of P(W = 1). Let Tk
n , k = 1;:::;10;000, be the lower bound bootstrap estimate for




n be the expected lower bound from the
bootstrap distribution. Finally, we compute the estimated bias, b b, and the bias-corrected MIV
estimator, Tc
n = 2Tn￿ E￿(Tn).
The bootstrap is also used to provide a tractable way to form con￿dence intervals for our
estimates of bounds on the disability rate. To do this, we ￿rst apply the percentile-bootstrap
method (bias-corrected) to derive 90% con￿dence intervals for the upper and lower bounds (see
Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). The interval on the lower bound, for example, is de￿ned by the
0:05 and 0:95 quantiles of the bootstrap distribution of the estimated bound. A Bonferroni joint
con￿dence interval with a level of at least 90% is then derived by taking by the 0:05 quantile from
17The bootstrap bias correction e⁄ectively reduces ￿nite sample bias (in monte-carlo simulations) and is asymptot-
ically e¢ cient at higher orders in a variety of di⁄erent settings. See, for example, Parr (1983), Efron and Tibshirani
(1993), Hahn et al. (2002), and Ramalho (2005). Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming) apply this method of correcting
the MIV estimator in a di⁄erent application.
17the bootstrap distribution of the lower bound estimator and the 0:95 quantile of the distribution
of the upper bound estimator.18
4. SPECIFIC STRATEGIES AND RESULTS
In this section, we provide details about our speci￿c veri￿cation strategies and present empirical
results. Throughout, we report estimated HM bounds, veri￿cation bounds, and MIV bounds. We
begin by considering the problem of drawing inferences on the broader de￿nition of disability
involving some limitation in the kind or amount of work that can be performed. In Section 4.1,
we bound the true disability rate under two di⁄erent sets of veri￿cation assumptions. In Section
4.2, we assess identi￿cation decay when we use measures of functional limitation to corroborate
subjective measures of work limitation. For example, one could decide not to verify work limitation
among respondents who report no functional limitation. Finally, in Section 4.3 we consider drawing
inferences on work incapacity, the more restrictive de￿nition of work disability. Focusing on the
subpopulation of disability insurance applicants, we assess whether the data provide any evidence
of bias in the SSA award decision.
4.1 VERIFICATION STRATEGIES
Many researchers have argued that the propensity to provide inaccurate reports of work limita-
tion may be linked to particular observed groups of respondents. Researchers have argued that the
extent of response errors is likely to vary by employment status (e.g., Stern, 1989; Kreider, 1999;
McGarry, 2004; Lindeboom and Kerkhofs, 2004), applications to and participation in government
disability insurance programs (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999; Kreider, 2000), reported disability
status (Institute of Medicine, 2002), and other observed covariates.
Following this theme, we evaluate what can be learned about the true disability rate when
certain observed groups are assumed to provide accurate responses, or at least to provide some lower
bound degree of accurate reporting. While most of the earlier research uses latent variable models to
18Horowitz and Manski (1998) and Manski and Pepper (2000 ￿see the longer NBER version) also use and discuss
Bonferroni intervals to derive con￿dence intervals for bounds.
18study more complex structural questions relating health, government assistance, and labor market
behaviors, we focus attention on inferring disability alone. This setting allows us to strip away
the parametric assumptions used in most of the previous literature and focus on exploiting the
rich HRS data to assess the identifying power of di⁄erent assumptions on the reporting process.
Thus, when formulating veri￿cation strategies, we borrow from the basic ideas contained in the
existing literature but, at the same time, thoroughly examine the extensive health and labor market
information available in the HRS.
We aim to verify self-reported disability status for cases that appear to be the most credible
and to not verify cases that involve some type of ambiguity or inconsistency. For example, previous
studies have veri￿ed the self-reports of workers under the premise that workers face few incentives
to misreport. But of the 6503 respondents reporting to be gainfully employed, 733 report elsewhere
in the survey either zero hours, zero earnings, or being nonemployed. Given these labor market
inconsistencies, we do not verify the work limitation responses of such individuals based on employ-
ment status alone (they might be veri￿ed based on other information). Likewise, we do not verify
the responses of the 58 individuals who claimed to be able-bodied in one part of the survey but
disabled or receiving disability bene￿ts in another part of the survey.
Given the inherent uncertainty about which responses should be veri￿ed, we present two di⁄erent
models of partial veri￿cation tailored to the work disability measure of interest. Model I involves
relatively strong veri￿cation assumptions, some of which are relaxed in Model II.
We begin with the broad measure of disability involving some work limitation. Veri￿cation
strategies for the narrower disability measure are presented in Section 4.3. For Model I, we treat
disability status reports of X as veri￿ed (with discussion below) for:
1. those currently working for pay (HRS variable V2717=1) except those who (a) report that
they receive disability bene￿ts from any program, (b) did not check the ￿working￿box in
question F1a (variable V2701) for current employment status, or (c) do not report positive
labor hours and positive earnings (i.e., either value is zero or missing);
192. those reporting no work limitation (X = 0), except those who (a) report receiving disability
bene￿ts or (b) checked ￿disabled￿in box F1d (variable V2701) for current employment status;
3. those reporting a work limitation (X = 1) if they also report being unable to work altogether
due to one of the six serious conditions listed in Table 1 (Wallace and Herzog 1995, p.S90);
4. disability bene￿ciaries (reporting X = 1), except those who report that they are (a) currently
working or (b) able to work.19
In Model I, 91:9% of the sample is veri￿ed. Borrowing from the existing literature, we verify
the responses of most workers and of most respondents reporting to be able-bodied. In both cases,
there appear to be few economic or psychological factors that would lead to misreporting. However,
in each case exceptions are made for potentially con￿ icting information. The responses of workers
who receive disability bene￿ts are not veri￿ed, nor does employment status confer veri￿cation if
there exists contradictory information on labor hours or earnings. Similarly, we verify X = 0 cases
except in the face of contradictory evidence that the respondent is receiving disability bene￿ts or
reports being disabled earlier in the survey. We verify the presence of at least some work limitation,
X = 1, if the respondent reports complete work incapacity caused by a health condition that is
known to often be debilitating and associated with relatively few false positive diagnoses.
Veri￿cation of disability bene￿ciaries is a more subtle matter that deserves additional attention.
The maintained assumption is that, in the absence of labor force participation, the receipt of
disability bene￿ts among those claiming to be unable to work at all corroborates the existence of at
least some work limitation. Many have raised concerns that bene￿ciaries are inclined to exaggerate
the extent of their limitations and that disability awards are prone to classi￿cation errors. Verifying
some work limitation among this subset of bene￿ciaries, however, does not imply that the awards
process is without error or that bene￿ciaries do not exaggerate the extent of limitation; it only
requires that adjudication errors are not so extreme that bene￿ciaries who report complete work
incapacity are not work-limited at all.
Model II relaxes some of these assumptions. In particular, in Model II responses are ￿unveri￿ed￿
19For this purpose, bene￿ciaries include all respondents who reported receiving disability bene￿ts from any public
or private program. Respondents were queried about the receipt of disability bene￿ts from a variety of programs
(e.g., SSDI, SSI, Veterans￿Disability, ￿State disability program,￿Employer/union plan).
20as follows: (1) proxy responses are never veri￿ed,20 (2) X = 0 cases are not veri￿ed if the respondent
(a) reports pain of at least moderate severity, at its worst, that makes activities di¢ cult or (b) has
one of the six serious medical conditions and reports being limited in housework or other activities
besides paid work, and (3) X = 1 cases are no longer veri￿ed based on reporting one of the six
serious health conditions. Under these more conservative assumptions, at least 78:4% of the sample
is known to provide accurate responses.
4.1.A VERIFICATION BOUNDS
Table III presents the estimated bounds for the true disability rate and their 90% con￿dence
intervals. Column A provides results under the corrupt sampling assumption alone. Under both
Models I and II, the bounds re￿ ect much uncertainty about the true disability rate. If at least 91:9%
of respondents are known to provide accurate reports, for example, the HM bounds constrain the
true disability rate to lie within [0:127;0:288]. Without additional information about the reporting
process, the disability rate may lie anywhere within this 16 point range.
In this setting, a primary function of the bounds is to test the validity of alternative measures
of disability and models of the reporting error process. If the veri￿cation assumptions are correct,
estimates lying signi￿cantly outside the bounds cannot be valid measures of true disability. Ta-
ble 1 contains various possible alternative measures of disability. Most notably, the self-reported
disability rate of 20:8% lies within the 16 point range and thus cannot be rejected as being an
accurate measure of true disability. Neither, however, can we reject the possibility that the fraction
of respondents reporting to be in fair or poor physical health (18:6%), the fraction reporting to
be in poor mental health (22:7%), or the fraction reporting to have one of the six serious medical
conditions (27:3%), are valid measures of work disability (see Table 1). Alternative measures lying
outside of this range can be rejected as measures of work disability. We see, for example that the
incidence of non-ideal body mass (58:9%) and the subsequent mortality rate (3:0%), lie far outside
20In our sample, 5 percent of responses come from proxy reports. Lee et al. (2004) compare estimates of the number
of disabled by respondent type in an environment in which self-response versus proxy was randomized. Among their
primary ￿ndings, self-respondents and proxy respondents were equally likely to report disability during the initial
interview, but proxy respondents were less likely to report disability in the second wave of the survey.
21of the estimated bounds. Thus, given the assumption that at least 91:9% of respondents provide
accurate self-reports, we ￿nd that these alternative measures do not reveal the incidence of work
disabilities. These proxies appear to be measuring other aspects of health.21
Column B displays estimated bounds under the assumption that all veri￿ed respondents provide
accurate self-reports of disability. The veri￿cation assumption provides substantial identifying
power, but the speci￿cs are quite sensitive to the underlying model. Under Model I, the bounds
narrow to the seven point range of [0:135;0:215], a 50% reduction in the width of the bounds.
However, the width of the veri￿cation bounds increases by three-fold when we move from Model I,
where 92% of respondents are veri￿ed, to Model II, where 78% of respondents are veri￿ed. These
changes in the underlying assumptions about the nature and extent of reporting errors generate
large changes in the uncertainty about the disability rate.
Although the veri￿cation bounds can be substantially more informative than the HM bounds,
they still provide only limited information on the true disability rate unless a large fraction of the
caseload is veri￿ed to provide completely accurate information. When we relax the parametric
restrictions applied in much of the literature and isolate the identifying power of the veri￿cation
assumptions, there remains much uncertainty about the true disability rate. Consistent with con-
cerns raised by Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004), these results suggest that conclusions about reporting
errors based on latent variable models are driven largely by parametric assumptions. Moreover, we
￿nd that some alternative disability measures do not seem to resolve the identi￿cation problems.
Instead, these measures appear to capture some other dimension of health or limitation.
4.1.B MIV BOUNDS
We can reduce uncertainty about the disability rate at the cost of imposing stronger assump-
tions. In this section, we combine veri￿cation assumptions with MIV restrictions and illustrate how
inferences vary across the di⁄erent models. First, we combine the assumption that true disability
21In a regression framework, these measures might still serve as important control variables for health and limitation,
and perhaps as valid instrumental variables for the true disability rate.
22weakly increases with age, as discussed above, with the restriction that the disability rate is no
higher among the employed than among the nonemployed: P(W = 1jL = 0) ￿ P(W = 1jL = 1),
where L indicates whether a respondent participates in the labor market.22 Second, we combine
this employment monotonicity assumption with an assumption that ￿tted values from an ordered
probit model of federal disability applications comprise an MIV. In particular, a natural MIV can
be constructed as the outcome of a respondent￿ s Disability Insurance application decision. Let
this variable equal 0 if the respondent has not applied for disability bene￿ts, 1 if a disability ap-
plication was rejected, 2 if an application was accepted after appeal, and 3 if an application was
accepted initially. Using this variable, we constructed an MIV as the ￿tted values from an ordered
probit model that exploits information from attributes expected to in￿ uence work disability. The
speci￿cation includes indicators for each of the 17 health conditions listed in Table 1, indicators
for the functional limitation index (Levels 1-6), the indicator for subsequent mortality (died before
wave 2), the indicator for ideal body mass, the indicator for being often bothered by pain, age,
education, race, gender, marital status, veteran status, and asset level (details from this regression
are available upon request).23
The bias-corrected MIV estimates are reported in Columns C and D of Table 3. These MIV
assumptions have substantial identifying power. Under the age-employment MIV assumption,
the Model I bounds on the work limitation rate, for example, collapse to the three point range
[0:178;0:204], while the DI-employment MIV shrinks the bounds to [0:149;0:193]. In these cases,
the self-reported disability rate, 0:208, lies outside of these bounds for the true disability rate and
just on the edge of the upper bound of the conservative 90% con￿dence interval. These bounds
22If only workers are veri￿ed, the monotonicity assumption is not informative on the upper bound. The lower
bound is similar to the Proposition 1 bound except that it is not multiplied by the fraction of veri￿ed respondents,





vy ￿ P(X = 0jL = 1)
2vy ￿ 1
+ (1 ￿ ￿)P(X = 1jL = 1)
￿
￿ P(W = 1): (7)
In the special case that workers are known to provide fully accurate reports of work limitation, vy = 1; the population
disability rate is at least as large as the reported disability rate among workers, P(X = 1jL = 1). Note that this
assumption is equivalent to an assumption that the employment rate decreases with disability status: P(L = 1jW =
1) ￿ P(L = 1jW = 0).
23In the HRS, the incidence of moderate to severe functional limitation (e.g., Level 3 and above) is, up to sampling
variability, monotonic in age, employment status, and the disability application index.
23also do not contain the self-reported rate even if more than 10% of the veri￿ed respondents may
misreport.24 Thus, if the MIV assumptions are valid, these estimates provide some evidence of
misreporting. In particular, since the unveri￿ed group consists primarily of nonworkers who claim
to be disabled, we ￿nd some support for suggestions in the literature that members of this group
systematically over-report disability.
As before, however, the identi￿cation bounds decay rapidly as we relax the veri￿cation restric-
tions. The width of the age-employment MIV bound, for example, increases from the three point
range in Model I to a nearly 16 point range, [0:129;0:285], in Model II. Thus, under Model II
veri￿cation assumptions, there is much uncertainty about the true disability rate. In this case, the
self-reported disability rate of 20:8% lies within the estimated bounds, but so too does the fraction
of respondents reporting to be in fair or poor physical health (18:6%) and the fraction reporting to
have one of the six serious medical conditions (27:3%). The estimated bounds are quite sensitive to
the underlying assumptions; we generally cannot reject the possibility that all reports are accurate,
nor many di⁄erent alternatives.
4.2 FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
We now investigate the sensitivity of the estimated bounds to assumptions linking work dis-
ability to functional limitation. Measures of physical limitation in the HRS might corroborate ver-
i￿cation assumptions on self-reported disability. As noted in Section 2, disparities between these
health-related measures do not imply that either measure is invalid. Still, inconsistencies might
argue against veri￿cation. Arguably, for example, respondents with severe functional limitations
who report being able-bodied should not be veri￿ed as providing accurate reports of disability.
To study the sensitivity of the estimated bounds, we trace out the implications of a corroboration
24This result does not rely on strict independence between reporting errors and true disability status maintained
in Proposition 1, P(W = 1jY = 1;Z = 0) = P(W = 1jY = 1;Z = 1). To weaken this assumption, let the
disability rate among inaccurate reporters be some unknown multiple of the disability rate among accurate reports:
P(W = 1jY = 1;Z = 0) = ￿P(W = 1jY = 1;Z = 1) for some ￿ 2 [0;1), with ￿ = 1 under independence. If up
to 10% of the veri￿ed respondents may misreport (i.e., vy = 0:90), then accurate reporting of work limitation status
continues to be rejected under the age-employment MIV assumption when ￿ ￿ 3:2 ￿i.e., as long as the true disability
rate among inaccurate reporters is no more than 3:2 times the true disability rate among accurate reporters. If up
to half may misreport (vy = 0:50), then accurate reporting is rejected as long as ￿ ￿ 1:9.
24strategy that uses self-reports of functional limitation to weaken the veri￿cation assumptions. Some
researchers might be willing to assume that after accounting for self-reported disability, responses
to questions about functional limitation provide no further evidence about work disability. In that
case, the results presented in Table III apply. Otherwise, apparent inconsistencies between reports
of functional limitation and work limitation serve to caution against veri￿cation.
Table IV displays the estimated bounds for veri￿cation Models I and II under the age-employment
MIV assumption.25 Column 1 presents the lower bound estimates when no respondents are veri￿ed
if they report being disabled with a su¢ ciently low functional limitation index value (i.e., a value
less than or equal to the particular level of ￿). Column 2 presents the upper bound when no respon-
dents are veri￿ed if they report being able-bodied with a su¢ ciently high functional limitation value
(i.e., a value greater than or equal to the speci￿ed level of ￿). When we do not verify respondents
claiming to be disabled but also claiming to have no functional limitations, for example, the lower
bound decreases from 0:178 to 0:166: The lower bound falls further to 0:114 when respondents with
some di¢ culty with work functions (Level 3) are not veri￿ed. When we do not verify respondents
claiming to be able-bodied yet also having a severe functional limitation (￿ = 6), the upper bound
barely increases from 0:204 to 0:205. However, when we do not verify cases involving at least some
di¢ culty with basic work functions (Level 3), the upper bound increases to nearly 40%.
Inferences are clearly sensitive to how one models and assesses the relationship between reports
of functional and work limitation. Identi￿cation decays rapidly if disparities between these two
measures are taken to cast doubt on the validity of the self-reports of work limitation. Stated
di⁄erently, to the extent that self-reported limitation responses are believed to be reliable, we pro-
vide evidence that indicators of work limitation and functional limitation are measuring markedly
di⁄erent aspects of impairment.
25Analogous results under the DI index MIV assumption are available in Appendix B Table I.
254.3 WORK INCAPACITY AND THE SSA AWARD PROCESS
Thus far, we have focused on the problem of inferring the prevalence of impairment that limits
the kind or amount of work that can be undertaken. While this conceptualization is widely utilized
in research applications, the more restrictive de￿nition of work limitation is of more interest in
some settings. For example, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004) take the SSA￿ s de￿nition of disability ￿
￿the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity￿￿(see Section 2) as the basis for the
social standard for what constitutes work incapacity. In our HRS sample, 10:1% of respondents
report they are unable to work altogether. In this section, we ￿rst use the methods developed above
to place bounds on the true fraction of respondents nearing retirement age who are incapable of
work. We then turn our attention to the subsample of DI applicants to assess whether SSA award
outcomes are consistent with this conceptualization of disability.
Our veri￿cation assumptions for the ￿unable to work altogether￿ case are similar to those
described in Models I and II above for ￿some work limitation,￿with several notable di⁄erences.
Given the restrictive nature of this disability conceptualization, we impose stronger standards for
verifying disability and impose weaker standards for verifying nondisability. In Model I, reported
work incapacity (X = 1) is veri￿ed if the respondent is receiving disability bene￿ts and reports one
of the six aforementioned diagnosed conditions. The self-reported ability to work is veri￿ed unless
the respondent reports being nonemployed, having some work limitation, and receiving disability
bene￿ts. Under these assumptions, self-reports of work capacity are veri￿ed for 93:5% of the sample.
This percentage is slightly higher than the 91:9% obtained above for the ￿some work limitation￿
case because we verify the vast majority of responses reporting work capacity.
Under more conservative assumptions in Model II, we begin by unverifying reports from proxy
respondents. Otherwise, reported work incapacity is veri￿ed only if the respondent reports ￿dis-
abled￿as current employment status (V2701), reports the current receipt of disability bene￿ts, and
reports one of the six diagnosed conditions. Self-reported work capacity is no longer veri￿ed for
workers if the respondent reports some work limitation and either zero/missing labor hours or earn-
26ings. The reported ability to work among nonworkers is not veri￿ed if the respondent reports some
work limitation and any of the following are indicated: the receipt of disability bene￿ts, one of the
six diagnosed conditions, or the person responded ￿disabled￿as current employment status. Under
these more conservative assumptions, self-reports of work capacity are veri￿ed for 85:4 percent of
the sample.
Table V presents the base results. As before, we ￿nd that the veri￿cation and MIV restrictions
confer substantial identifying power. Consider veri￿cation Model I, where nearly 94 percent of the
respondents are veri￿ed as providing accurate reports. In this case, the HM bounds con￿ne the
disability rate to the 13 point range [0:036;0:166], whereas the veri￿cation bounds lie within the 6
point range [0:044;0:109]. These bounds shrink further to the four point range [0:049;0:089] under
the age-employment MIV assumption. As before, the MIV bounds under veri￿cation Model I do
not contain the self-reported rate of 10:1%, a ￿nding that is replicated under notable departures
from full veri￿cation.26 Under Veri￿cation Model II, however, the upper bound increases to 0:163,
much higher than the self-reported rate.
These veri￿cation bounds decay further after incorporating information about reported func-
tional limitations. In Table VI, we present estimates that require di⁄erent levels of corroboration
between measures of functional limitation and work limitation before verifying disability responses.
When using Level 3 as our corroboration cuto⁄ (some di¢ culty with physical or sedentary work
functions), the Model I lower bound falls from 0:049 to 0:040 and the upper bound increases from
0:089 to 0:362. Under Model II, the lower bound decreases to 0:032 and the upper bound increases
to 0:413.
The restrictive de￿nition of work disability is particularly germane for the subpopulation of DI
applicants who, to be awarded bene￿ts, must demonstrate the inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity. By focusing on this group of respondents, our bounding approach can supplement
insights into the validity of the DI award process. To obtain disability bene￿ts, applicants provide
26If up to 10% of the veri￿ed respondents may misreport (i.e., vy = 0:90), then accurate reporting under the broad
disability de￿nition is rejected in the HRS as long as ￿ ￿ 11 (see footnote 24). If up to half may misreport (vy = 0:50),
then accurate reporting is rejected as long as ￿ ￿ 5.
27detailed medical, income, and asset information to a federal SSA o¢ ce. Eligibility is strict, and
many applicants are denied bene￿ts on the grounds that they do not meet the medical severity
criteria. That is, the applicant is found to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. The
accuracy of this process has been the subject of both political and academic debate.
Using HRS data on DI applications, awards, and receipt, we compare the fraction of bene￿ciaries
to the estimated bounds on the true prevalence of work incapacity. Among the 9824 age-eligible
respondents, 1082 had applied for DI bene￿ts prior to the ￿rst interview. The ultimate award
decision, which can take a few months to a few years to be resolved, is discerned using information
from the ￿rst two waves of the HRS. For successful applicants, we also document whether the
respondent was receiving (or scheduled to receive) bene￿ts during the Wave 1 interview. This
allows us to compare self-reported disability status with concurrent determination of DI eligibility.
Of the 1082 disability applicants, 452 were initially awarded bene￿ts and 617 were initially denied.
The award decision was not available in Wave 1 for an additional 13 cases, but Wave 2 information
indicates that only one of these applications was ultimately successful.27 Of the 617 initially denied
cases, 430 continued through the appeals process, and 263 of these appeals were successful.28 Of
those awarded bene￿ts, 75 recipients were no longer participating in the program by Wave 1 of the
survey. Therefore, we ￿nd that 641 respondents (59:2% of the applicant pool) were receiving or
scheduled to receive bene￿ts at the time the questions about work limitation were asked.
Since the HRS collects disability status information at discrete times that do not necessarily
coincide with the time of the application and award decisions for DI bene￿ts, an important issue is
the relevant window of observation. In Table VII, we compare data on self-reports and SSA award
decisions for two di⁄erent time windows. In Panel A, we consider the relatively large subgroup
27Of the remaining 12 cases, ￿ve respondents indicated in Wave 2 that they had been denied bene￿ts. We classi￿ed
the other seven cases as denied as well: none reported receiving bene￿ts in either wave, and we found no indication of
pending decisions. None of the qualitative results depend on how we classify the relatively few cases for which there
is some ambiguity.
28By Wave 1 of the survey, 259 appeals were successful and 162 were not successful. For the remaining nine cases,
we used Wave 2 information to classify four applications as ultimately successful and the rest unsuccessful. The
decision whether to appeal was unavailable for three applicants; we classi￿ed each case as ultimately rejected based
on evidence from Wave 2.
28of all (age-eligible) HRS respondents who applied to receive DI bene￿ts regardless of when the
application was ￿led. In Panel B, we focus on the much smaller subsample of 233 applicants whose
most recent SSA adjudication date lies within six months of the Wave 1 interview date. These
two panels display the joint frequency distribution of the self-reports and DI bene￿ciary status.
For both observation windows, self-reported work incapacity and DI bene￿ciary status generally
concur, but this is clearly not always true. Nearly 33% of respondents in the larger sample and
43% of respondents in the smaller sample provide self-reports that di⁄er from the DI outcome. A
relatively small number of respondents report that they can work despite receiving bene￿ts. A
larger number report that they cannot work and are not receiving DI bene￿ts. Thus, a notably
larger fraction of applicants classify themselves as being unable to work ￿73% in the full sample
and 79% using the shorter horizon ￿than report the current receipt of disability bene￿ts ￿59%
and 47%, respectively.29
Bounds on the true rate of work incapacity may provide evidence about the accuracy of SSA
award decisions. If the award process accurately determines the rate at which applicants are unable
to engage in gainful activity, then the fraction of bene￿ciaries should lie within the estimated bounds
on the true disability rate. If the fraction of bene￿ciaries instead lies outside of the bounds, then
we can reject the joint hypothesis that the SSA award process is accurate and forms the basis for
the social de￿nition of work incapacity. Like Ben￿tez-Silva et al.￿ s (2004) test of Rational Unbiased
Reporting, we test for accurate award decisions on average, not for a particular individual.
Table VIII presents the bounds on the true work incapacity rate for both observation windows.
Bounds under Models I and II are provided in both cases, and the age-employment MIV bounds
29Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004) ￿nd the marginal distribution of the ultimate DI award outcome to be very similar
to the marginal distribution of self-classi￿ed work incapacity status. There are several notable di⁄erences between
the sampling frames and assignment rules that are likely to explain these di⁄erences. First, whereas we focus on
respondents in the ￿rst wave of the survey, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. use the ￿rst three waves. This allows them to observe
new and repeat applications that are not included in our subsample of DI applicants. Second, Ben￿tez-Silva et al.
de￿ne an observation window that restricts attention to individuals who applied for DI bene￿ts within a one-year
window surrounding the interview date (6 months before and after). Third, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. do not restrict the
sample to age-eligible respondents nearing retirement age. Finally, whereas we classify outcomes based on the current
receipt of DI bene￿ts, Ben￿tez-Silva et al. classify outcomes based on whether the applicant was approved to receive
bene￿ts. As shown in Appendix B Table II, the fraction of bene￿ciaries rises to 66% in the full sample and to 51%
using the shorter horizon if we reclassify the 75 successful applicants no longer receiving bene￿ts as bene￿ciaries.
29are provided for the larger subpopulation of all age-eligible HRS applicants.30 In all cases, the
estimated bounds are rather wide, and in all cases the bounds include the DI bene￿ciary rate.
Consider the tightest bounds found under the Model I MIV assumptions. For the subsample of all
age-eligible HRS applicants, we estimate the true work incapacity rate to lie within [0:505;0:751].
Since the bounds overlap with the fraction of applicants that was deemed eligible for assistance
(59%), we ￿nd no evidence of bias of the SSA award decision under the maintained assumptions.
Thus, without additional information on the reporting process, we cannot reject the possibility that
the true work incapacity rate equals the DI bene￿ciary rate of around 60%. Nor, however, can we
reject the possibility the true rate equals the self-reported work incapacity rate of nearly 75%.
5. CONCLUSION
While questions have been raised about the validity of many self-reported measures, surveys of
disability have been especially controversial. Quantifying disability is conceptually di¢ cult, and
there is no commonly accepted gold standard for its measurement. In addition to random errors
associated with self-reports associated with somewhat ambiguous questions, systematic errors can
arise if a person￿ s self-assessed disability status is in￿ uenced by economic or psychological factors.
The nature and extent of these errors has been debated in the academic literature for more than
two decades since Anderson and Burkhauser (1984) characterized disability measurement problems
in survey datasets as ￿the major unsettled issue in the empirical literature on the labor supply of
older workers.￿Today, especially since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
in 1990, these measures have become a matter of growing public concern. The National Council on
Disability (NCD 2002), for example, argues that the use of self-reported disability information can
lead to dangerous public policy decisions. The Council goes so far as to suggest that the federal
government should not support the dissemination of self-reported work limitation data due to a
lack of acceptable methods for assessing disabilities.
This paper provides and illustrates a methodology for partially identifying work disability rates.
30The MIV estimates are unreliable when using the smaller sample of 233 respondents.
30Our framework allows us to explore the identifying power of a range of di⁄erent assumptions that
bridge the gap between completely discarding the data (e.g., as suggested by the NCD) and taking
all of the data at face value. Under strong assumptions, we are able to nearly identify the disability
rate. Identi￿cation of this controversial parameter decays as some of the identifying assumptions are
relaxed. The patterns of identi￿cation decay are striking. Without strong prior information on the
nature and degree of accurate reporting, the bounds are frustratingly wide. Moreover, the bounds
can be sensitive to relatively minor changes in the underlying classi￿cation error models. The
results are especially sensitive to how one models potential inconsistencies between the subjective
self-assessments of work limitation and more objective measures of functional limitation.
In the end, however, our results do not imply that the use of self-reported disability should
be abandoned. To the contrary, these self-reports seem to provide valuable information about
work capacity beyond that captured in alternative measures of health (such as the existence of
speci￿c medical conditions, functional limitations, or proxy measures like body-mass and subsequent
mortality). More ￿objective￿ measures may be less prone to classi￿cation error, yet they may
also contain far less information about work capacity than responses to direct questions about a
person￿ s ability to work. Still, there are currently large gaps in our knowledge about the extent
to which policy conclusions are being driven by untenable assumptions on the reporting error
processes. Given this uncertainty, there exists a need for better information on the degree and
nature of reporting errors on work limitation. The Institute of Medicine (2002) has called for more
methodological research on these measurement issues. We hope that our nonparametric bounding
framework can be used as a stepping stone for resolving the uncertainty about how best to measure
work limitations and model disability, labor supply, and the receipt of public transfers.
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Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify notation, let the conditioning on the veri￿ed subgroup, Y = 1, be implicit. Then the
law of total probability implies:
P(X = 1) = P(W = 1jZ = 1)P(Z = 1) + P(W = 0jZ = 0)P(Z = 0): (8)
The independence assumption requires P(W = 0jZ = 1) = P(W = 0jZ = 0): Substituting for
P(W = 0jZ = 0) in (??) and using the fact that W is binary, it follows that P(X = 1) = P(W =
1jZ = 1)[2P(Z = 1) ￿ 1] + [1 ￿ P(Z = 1)]. Therefore,
P(W = 1) = P(W = 1jZ = 1) =
P(X = 1) ￿ 1 + P(Z = 1)
2P(Z = 1) ￿ 1
=
P(Z = 1) ￿ P(X = 0)
2P(Z = 1) ￿ 1
:
Although P(Z) is unknown, we know that vy ￿ P(Z = 1) ￿ 1: Thus, we can bound the disability
rate by assessing P(W = 1jZ = 1) across the possible values of P(Z = 1). It follows that if
vy ￿ P(X = 0), the lower bound on the true disability rate is zero. Likewise, if vy ￿ P(X = 1),
the upper bound is one. Otherwise, di⁄erentiating this equation with respect to P(Z) reveals that
if P(X = 0) > P(X = 1), then P(W = 1) is increasing in P(Z = 1) for all conjectured values of
P(Z = 1) > P(X = 0). Otherwise, it is decreasing in P(Z = 1). ￿ 
Table I.  Means and Standard Deviations 
  
      
Reported Work 
Limitation?  
Reported Inability to 
Work Altogether? 
    Full  Sample    Yes  No  Yes  No 
   N=9824      N=2039  N=7785   N=992   N=8832 
   Mean   Std.  Dev.    Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean 
Age   56.0       3.18    56.4*   55.9   56.6*   55.9 
Years of schooling    12.0      3.24    10.8*    12.3    10.3*    12.2 
Female      0.532      0.499      0.538      0.530      0.526      0.532 
Nonwhite      0.286      0.452      0.359*       0.267      0.435*      0.269 
White collar occupation
a       0.246      0.431        0.132*      0.276      0.106*      0.262 
Currently working for pay      0.683      0.465      0.296*      0.784      0.000*      0.759 
Ever applied for SSDI/SSI benefits      0.110      0.313      0.528*      0.001      0.792*      0.034 
Currently receive SSDI/SSI benefits      0.065      0.246      0.311*      0.000      0.537*      0.012 
Currently receive disability benefits from  any program      0.073      0.260      0.351*      0.000      0.586*      0.016 
Reported fair/poor general health status
b      0.186      0.389      0.423*      0.124      0.535*      0.147 
Reported fair/poor emotional health status
b      0.227      0.419      0.651*      0.115      0.824*      0.160 
Often bothered by pain, at least moderate at its worst      0.219      0.414      0.573*      0.126      0.673*      0.168 
Pain interferes with normal work      0.165      0.371      0.537*      0.067      0.665*      0.109 
Died prior to second wave      0.030      0.171      0.075*      0.018      0.111*      0.021 
Body mass index out of ideal range
c      0.589      0.492      0.622*      0.580      0.628*      0.584 
ADL/IADL functional limitation index (0-6)
d      1.51      1.84      3.34*      1.04      3.98*      1.24 
    Level 0: No functional limitation      0.540      0.498      0.139*      0.645      0.047*      0.595 
    Level 1: Some difficulty with very physical work functions      0.055      0.229      0.043*      0.059      0.028*      0.058 
    Level 2: Very difficult/can't do one of the very physical  
                   work functions      0.031      0.175      0.038
†      0.030      0.031      0.031 
    Level 3: Some difficulty with physical or sedentary  
                   work functions      0.177      0.382      0.220*      0.166      0.175      0.178 
    Level 4: Very difficult/can't do one of the physical  
                   work or sedentary work functions      0.141      0.348      0.337*      0.089      0.374*      0.114 
    Level 5: Some difficulty with any basic function      0.034      0.181      0.131*      0.008      0.194*      0.016 
    Level 6: Very difficult/can't do one of the basic functions      0.022      0.145      0.092*      0.003      0.150*      0.007 
(continued) Table 1, Continued 
Specific health conditions
e                    
    Diabetes (current and taking insulin)      0.083      0.276       0.172*      0.060      0.191*      0.071 
    Cancer (treatment in last 12 months)      0.037      0.190      0.063*      0.031      0.076*      0.033 
    Chronic lung disease (with activity limitations)      0.032      0.176      0.127*      0.007      0.184*      0.015 
    Heart condition (congestive heart disease with medication  
        or accompanied by shortness of breath)      0.084      0.277      0.227*      0.046      0.290*      0.061 
    Stroke (with health consequences)      0.017      0.128      0.067*      0.004      0.108*      0.006 
    Psychiatric problem (current with medication or treatment)      0.104      0.306      0.246*      0.067      0.301*      0.082 
    Arthritis      0.344      0.475      0.600*      0.277      0.651*      0.309 
    Hypertension      0.153      0.360      0.275*      0.121      0.322*      0.134 
Conditions by organ system
f                    
    Asthma      0.061      0.240      0.120*      0.046      0.151*      0.051 
    Back problems      0.346      0.476      0.593*      0.281      0.628*      0.314 
    Problems with legs or feet      0.356      0.479      0.675*      0.273      0.751*      0.312 
    Kidney or bladder problems      0.107      0.309      0.237*      0.073      0.282*      0.088 
    Stomach or intestinal ulcers      0.095      0.294      0.193*      0.070      0.233*      0.080 
    High cholesterol      0.241      0.428      0.309*      0.223      0.339*      0.230 
    Fracture since age 45      0.138      0.345      0.201*      0.122      0.193*      0.132 
    Poor eyesight (with glasses)      0.032      0.177      0.101*      0.014      0.126*      0.022 
    Poor hearing (with hearing aid)      0.024      0.153      0.050*      0.017      0.058*      0.020 
Number of reported conditions in previous two categories      2.08      1.92      4.02*      1.58      4.63*      1.78 
Reported a severe condition
g      0.273      0.446      0.593*      0.190      0.712*      0.224 
                    
                    
*
,†Significant  difference between the “yes” and “no” responses at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
aOccupation at onset of disability if reporting a work limitation and this information is available; current or most recent occupation otherwise. 
bOther categories include excellent, very good, and good health status. 
cIdeal body mass is defined as 20-25 kg/m
2 following Fahey et al. (1997).  
dFollowing Lobrest et al. (1995, p.  S297), we construct four categories of functions as described in the text: (I) basic functions, (II) sedentary work functions,  
  (III) physical work functions, and (IV) very physical work functions.  For each activity, a respondent can answer “not at all difficult,” “a little difficult,”  
  “somewhat difficult,” “very difficult/can't do,” or “don’t do.”  The last two categories are grouped together.  Respondents were told to exclude any limitation  
  expected to last less than three months.  The functional limitation index takes on values 0-6 as defined by Level 0 – Level 6 in the table. 
e,fDefined by Wallace and Herzog (1995,  pS89 and Table 1);  we additionally include poor eyesight (with glasses) and poor hearing (with hearing aid). 




Table II.  Correlations Between Health Indicators 
                
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                
(1)  Self-reported  work  limitation              
(2)  Self-reported  inability  to  work    0.65*          
(3)  Reported  fair/poor  general  health  status    0.52* 0.48*          
(4)  Reported  fair/poor  emotional  health  status    0.31* 0.30*  0.45*         
(5)  Died  prior  to  second  wave    0.13* 0.16*  0.15*  0.08*        
(6)  Body Mass Index out of ideal range    0.03* 0.03*  0.05*  0.04*  0.02
†       
(7)  ADL/IADL  functional  limitation  index  (0-6)    0.51* 0.45* 0.47* 0.33* 0.12* 0.07*        
(8)  Often bothered by pain, at least moderate    0.44* 0.37* 0.39* 0.29* 0.05* 0.04* 0.46*      
(9)  Pain  interferes  with  normal  work    0.51* 0.45* 0.45* 0.33* 0.09* 0.04* 0.48* 0.75*    
(10)  Number of reported health conditions    0.52* 0.45* 0.54* 0.38* 0.13* 0.05* 0.54* 0.50* 0.52*  
(11)  Reported a severe condition    0.37* 0.33* 0.41* 0.30* 0.13* 0.03* 0.31* 0.23* 0.26* 0.50* 
                
                
*
,†significantly different from zero at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
         
Table III.  Corrupt Sampling, Partial Verification, and MIV Bounds on P(W=1) 
 
 Work Limitation Case 
     





Verification Bounds   
Age and Employment  
MIV Bounds   
Disability Application 
and Employment MIV Bounds 
 
Verification Model I
†    
     vy = 1  vy = 0.9    vy = 1  vy = 0.9 
[0.127,  0.288]
a      [0.135,  0.215]     [0.178,  0.204]
c  [0.106,  0.204]    [0.149,  0.193]  [0.120,  0.193] 
[0.121   0.298]
b    [0.129   0.223]    [0.155   0.207]  [0.086   0.207]    [0.143   0.209]  [0.112   0.209] 
          +0.010  -0.016
d   +0.016  -0.016     +0.009  -0.005   +0.006  -0.005 
   
Verification Model II
‡ 
     vy = 1  vy = 0.9    vy = 1  vy = 0.9 
[0.000,  0.423]    [0.103,  0.318]    [0.129,  0.285]  [0.065,  0.285]    [0.110,  0.320]  [0.089,  0.320] 
[0.000   0.434]    [0.098   0.326]    [0.115,  0.300]  [0.051,  0.300]    [0.104,  0.325]  [0.080,  0.325] 
          +0.013  -0.013   +0.013  -0.013     +0.008  -0.008   +0.006  -0.008 
†For Model I (v = 0.919), work limitation status X (but not work incapacity status) is treated as verified for members of the following groups: 
    (1) disability beneficiaries (reporting X=1) unless currently working or report able to work  
    (2) those currently working for pay (V2717=1) unless (a) receiving disability benefits, (b) did not check the “working” box in question 
          F1a (V2701) for current employment status, (c) labor hours are zero/missing, or (d) earnings are zero/missing 
    (3) those reporting no work limitation (X=0) unless also report receiving disability benefits or checked “disabled” as current employment status 
    (4) those reporting work limitation (X=1) if report unable to work due to one of the six serious diagnosed conditions highlighted by Wallace and  
          Herzog (1995): treated for cancer in the last 12 months, diabetic taking insulin, chronic lung disease that limits activities, congestive heart  
          disease with treatment or shortness of breath, stroke with health consequences, or current psychiatric/emotional problem with medication or  
          other treatment 
 
‡Model II (v = 0.784) differs from Model I in that: (1) proxy responses are never verified, (2) X=1 cases are not verified based on specific medical  
     conditions, and (3) X=0 cases are never verified if the respondent (a) reports pain of at least moderate severity at its worst that makes activities  
     difficult or (b) has a serious/objective medical condition defined in Model I and reports being limited in housework or other activities. 
 
apoint estimates of the population bounds 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95
th percentile bounds 
cMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
destimated finite-sample bias   
 
*There are 22 missing values for reported work limitation X; the estimated bounds conservatively take worst case scenarios for these missing values. 
  
Table IV.  Sensitivity of Age and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Work Limitation Case, Model I 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.166
a 0.205 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.152
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.210 
0.160 0.209 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.146 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.217 
0.148 0.271 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.143 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.279 
0.114 0.398 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.104 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.411 
0.089 0.422 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.076 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.431 
0.081 0.482 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.070 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 





Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95






Table IV, Cont.  Sensitivity of Age and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Work Limitation Case: Model II 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.122
a 0.285 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.110
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.302 
0.119 0.286 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.107 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.299 
0.110 0.357 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.101 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.365 
0.093 0.458 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.085 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.469 
0.089 0.479 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.076 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.490 
0.078 0.527 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.065 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.536 
Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95
th percentile bounds 
 
  
Table V.  Corrupt Sampling, Partial Verification, and MIV Bounds on P(W=1) 
 
 Unable to Work Case 
     





Verification Bounds   
Age and Employment  
MIV Bounds   
Disability Application 
and Employment MIV Bounds 
 
Verification Model I
†    
     vy = 1  vy = 0.9    vy = 1  vy = 0.9 
[0.036,  0.166]
a      [0.044,  0.109]     [0.049,  0.089]
c  [0.032,  0.089]    [0.048,  0.072]  [0.045,  0.072] 
[0.033   0.174]
b    [0.041   0.114]    [0.042   0.097]  [0.025   0.097]    [0.042   0.084]  [0.038   0.084] 
          +0.009  -0.008
d   +0.011  -0.008     +0.003  -0.002   +0.003  -0.002 
   
Verification Model II
‡ 
     vy = 1  vy = 0.9    vy = 1  vy = 0.9 
[0.000,  0.247]    [0.037,  0.184]    [0.043,  0.163]  [0.031,  0.163]    [0.042,  0.152]  [0.040,  0.152] 
[0.000   0.256]    [0.034   0.190]    [0.038   0.175]  [0.022   0.175]    [0.037,  0.165]  [0.034,  0.165] 
          +0.009  -0.013   +0.010  -0.013     +0.002  -0.007   +0.002  -0.007 
†Model I (v = 0.935): Reported work incapacity (X=1) is treated as verified if the respondent receives disability benefits and reports one of the six 
  serious diagnosed conditions highlighted by Wallace and Herzog (1995): treated for cancer in the last 12 months, diabetic taking insulin, chronic  
  lung disease that limits activities, congestive heart disease with treatment or shortness of breath, stroke with health consequences, or current  
  psychiatric/emotional problem with medication or other treatment.  Reported work capacity (X=0) is verified for workers (L=1).  For nonworkers,  
  work capacity is verified unless the respondent reports some work limitation and the receipt of disability benefits.    
 
‡Model II (v = 0.854):  Proxy responses are never verified.  Otherwise, reported work incapacity (X=1) is verified if the respondent receives  
  disability benefits, reports a serious/objective diagnosed condition (see above), and checked “disabled” as current employment status.  Reported  
  work capacity of workers remains verified unless the respondent reports some work limitation and labor hours or earnings are zero/missing.   
  Reported work capacity among nonworkers remains verified unless the respondent reports some work limitation and any of the following:  
  (a) receipt of disability benefits, (b) a serious/objective condition as defined in Model I, or (c) checked “disabled” as current employment status. 
 
apoint estimates of the population bounds 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95
th percentile bounds 
cMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 





 Table VI.  Sensitivity of Age and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Unable to Work Case, Model I 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.046
a 0.099 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.042
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.108 
0.044 0.113 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.040 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.119 
0.044 0.199 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.037 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.210 
0.040 0.362 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.033 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.374 
0.026 0.396 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.018 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.402 
0.011 0.453 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.006 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 




Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95






Table VI, cont.  Sensitivity of Age and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Unable to Work Case: Model II 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.044
a 0.170 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.038
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.177 
0.039 0.179 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.033 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.186 
0.038 0.261 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.033 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.272 
0.032 0.413 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.027 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.426 
0.022 0.440 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.016 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.450 
0.005 0.486 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.004 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.498 
Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95
th percentile bounds 
 
  
Table VII.  Self-reported Inability to Work and the 
   Receipt of SSDI/SSI Benefits 
 




“Can’t Work” totals 
          0          1   
0      193      103     296 (27.4%)  
1      248        538       786 (72.6%) 
totals      441 
(40.8%)  




B. Age-Eligible Applicants with Most Recent Adjudication 




“Can’t Work” totals 
        0           1   
0      37         13     50 (21.5%) 
1      87         96   183 (78.5%) 
totals    124 
(53.2%)      109 
(46.8%)  233 
 
 
a Category 1 includes those awarded and still receiving benefits; category 0  







Table VIII.  Age and Employment MIV Bounds on Work Incapacity 
among SSDI/SSI Applicants 
P(Unable to Work) Among SDI/SSI Applicants 
  
A. All Applicants 
  
B. Applicants with the Most Recent  
     Adjudication Date Within Six  
    Months of the Interview Date
                                                                                                
                                 Verification Model I
† 
 
 No  MIV  Age and 
Employment MIV   No  MIV  
          
   [0.381,  0.791]    [0.505,  0.751]
a    [0.335,  0.837]
d  
   [0.357   0.811]    [0.441   0.790]
b    [0.288   0.871]
b  
    +0.056  -0.062
c          
                                 Verification Model II
‡ 
 
 No  MIV 
Age and 
Employment MIV    No MIV   
          
  [0.324,  0.894]    [0.432,  0.863]    [0.275,  0.906]   
  [0.302   0.909]      [0.382   0.892]    [0.227   0.936]   
    +0.051  -0.051        
 
Note: Case A (all applicants) imposes the age and employment MIV assumption.  We do not  
           impose the MIV assumption for Case B due to insufficient sample sizes.   
 
†,‡See definitions in text or previous table footnotes 
  
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95
th percentile bounds 
cestimated finite-sample bias   











Appendix Table Ia.  Sensitivity of DI and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Work Limitation Case, Model I 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.146
a 0.198 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.141
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.213 
0.144 0.210 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.139 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.230 
0.129 0.290 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.125 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.296 
0.101 0.425 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.095 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.430 
0.067 0.448 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.059 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.454 
0.045 0.493 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.039 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 




Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95




Appendix Table Ia, cont.  Sensitivity of DI and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Work Limitation Case: Model II 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.108
a 0.321 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.100
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.328 
0.106 0.324 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.101 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.330 
0.096 0.373 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.091 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.379 
0.075 0.481 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.069 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.489 
0.053 0.499 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.046 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.507 
0.038 0.537 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.029 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.547 
Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95





Appendix Table Ib.  Sensitivity of DI and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Unable to Work Case, Model I 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.046
a 0.091 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.041
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.102 
0.045 0.118 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.040 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.126 
0.043 0.230 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.037 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.236 
0.037 0.388 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.032 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.395 
0.020 0.415 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.016 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.422 
0.009 0.467 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.006 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 




Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95





Appendix Table Ib, cont.  Sensitivity of DI and Employment MIV Bounds when Requiring Functional Limitation Corroboration 
 
Unable to Work Case: Model II 
 
            
            
  Lower Bound        Upper Bound   
            
  X=1 (reports work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≤ θ 
     X=0 (reports no work limitation) is never 
verified if ADL limitation index ≥ θ 
 
            
0.041
a 0.164 
θ=0: no  functional  limitation 
0.036
b 
  θ=6:  very difficult/can't do at least 
  one basic function 
0.178 
0.039 0.188 
θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.034 
  θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.197 
0.037 0.284 
θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.031 
  θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.291 
0.032 0.427 
θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.028 
  θ=3:  some difficulty with at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.436 
0.018 0.452 
θ=4:  very difficult/can’t do at least one 
  physical or sedentary work function 
0.015 
  θ=2:  very difficult/can't do at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.460 
0.008 0.502 
θ=5:  some difficulty with at least one 
  basic function 
0.006 
  θ=1:  some difficulty with at least one 
  very physical work function 
0.508 
Note: Functional limitation index defined by Loprest et al. (1995).  See discussion in text. 
 
aMIV point estimates, corrected for finite-sample bias 
bbootstrapped 5
th and 95




Appendix Table II.  Self-reported Inability to Work and the 
               SSDI/SSI Award Decision 
 




“Can’t Work” totals 
          0         1   
0      155     141     296 (27.4%) 
1      211     575     786 (72.6%) 
totals      366 
(33.8%) 




B. Age-Eligible Applicants with Most Recent Adjudication 




“Can’t Work” totals 
        0          1   
0      35        15       50 (21.5%) 
1      79      104     183 (78.5%) 
totals    114 
(48.9%)     119 
(51.1%)    233 
 
 
a Category 1 includes those awarded benefits, whether still receiving them 
   or not; category 0 includes rejected applicants 
 
 
 
 
 